

Extended Deterrence in Interesting Times

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Introduction

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The United States and its allies face a variety of challenges:

- Decline in relative U.S. military/economic power.
- Growing list of challengers with revisionist objectives.

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■ Diversified, complex international system (regionalism).

Dredging activity

■ Paradox: One can argue that U.S. influence is growing.

- Less capable but more valuable (salience of interests).
- Allies need U.S. more than ever (assurance conundrum).

■ How will U.S. manage extended deterrence network?

Construction activity

New terrain

Dredging activity



Extending Extended Deterrence

Question: Can the United States continue to deter in a period of relative decline? (Short answer: Yes.)

Study: Erik Gartzke & Koji Kagotani. 2015. “Trust in Tripwires: Deployments, Costly Signaling and Extended General Deterrence”

Summary:

- Main theories offer contrasting claims about deterrence:
 - Classical deterrence (Huth): Deployments inadequate.
 - Signaling (Fearon): Deployments are unnecessary.
- Neither approach explains moderate, durable deployments.
 - Need clarity about how deployments deter (in decline).
- Two tripwire mechanisms, “commitment” vs. “credibility.”
- Deployments are costly; *relative size signals priorities.*



Signaling through Deployments

“Show me your budget, and I’ll tell you what you value.”

- Budgets convey information (U.S. - Japan, endogeneity)
- Only the proportion of personnel spending on a given foreign deployment matters for extended deterrence (complex reasons: Ask me if you care about details).
 - Where countries put their money signals priority.
 - Good news: Effective extended deterrence can persist, even in periods of relative decline (leveraged, fragile).
 - Bad news: Credibility rests on revealing priorities; cannot pretend to care about everything everywhere.






Figure: Results for Different Variables: US-Japan






Figure: Effect of Tripwire Signaling



Debating Force Posture

Question: Can U.S. compensate for relative decline with a more flexible force posture? (Short answer: No.)

Study: Erik Gartzke & Koji Kagotani. 2015. “Being There: U.S. Troop Deployments, Force Posture and Alliance Reliability”

Summary:

- Result from “Tripwire” generalizes to all U.S. allies (weaker).
- Off-shoring forces *significantly increases* deterrence failure.
 - Deployments near – but not on – an ally’s territory signal ambiguous intentions; bad for deterrence.
 - Duality of deterrence objectives (tension in optimizing)
 - Stability (informational → min. uncertainty)
 - Action (monadic distributional → min. cost)
 - Influence (dyadic distributional → max. leverage)






Figure: Results for Different Variables: All US Allies



The Consequences of Force Structure

Question: Can reliance on mobile platforms/domains 'improve' extended deterrence? (Answer: No, and yes.)

- Tempting to rely on mobility in a period of heightened obligations and limited resources (ex: UK HMS Hood).
 - Mobility improves power projection and "presence"
 - But mobility increases uncertainty about intentions.
- The benefits of leveraged forces (lower costs, influence) is balanced by increased instability (deterrence failure)
 - Analogy from finance: fractional reserve banking system

Study: Gartzke. 2015. "The Influence of Seapower on Politics: Domain-/Platform-Specific Attributes of Material Capabilities"






Figure: Marginal Effect of Naval Tonnage on MID Location






Figure: Marginal Effect of Naval Tonnage on MID Initiation






Figure: Marginal Effect of Naval Platforms on MID Initiation






Figure: Marginal Effect of Submarine Platforms on MID Initiation






Figure: Marginal Effect of Naval Tonnage on Dipl. Recognition






Figure: Effect of Target Coastline Length on Dipl. Recognition






Figure: Number of Aircraft Carriers and Dipl. Recognition



Conclusions

Implications:

- ‘Normal’ extended deterrence works via force posture:
 - Priorities can be signaled through budget allocations:
 - “Tripwire” deployments signal defender credibility
 - They do not appear to generate much commitment.
 - “Being there” is much more beneficial than being near.
- Extended deterrence also influenced by force structure.
 - Mobility raises power projection, influence; instability.

Future work:

- Study of alliance leveraging (How much leverage is too much? Is failure gradual or catastrophic?)
- Assess alliance onset “shock” (“a logic of commitment”)

